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Working Draft — Version 2, 2026 · Policy framework, not an introduced bill

Plan for ProsperityNonpartisan fiscal framework
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Pillar B

Spending Efficiency

Brings U.S. unit costs closer to OECD norms, especially in healthcare, modernizes defense procurement, and extends Social Security solvency without cutting benefits for current retirees.

−$3.9 trillion · 10 policies · $2.5T–$5.0T in savings over 10 years

How to read the indicators

  • Fiscal. 10-year base case. Navy = revenue; green = savings; gold = scored investment cost.
  • Timeline. Highlighted span on a 20-year bar. “+” means work continues past Year 20.
  • Middle class. Hold-harmless test for households $40,000–$150,000.
  • Planetary. Climate and resource effect, independent of the fiscal score.

B1 · Pillar B

Standalone page

Social Security solvency package

10-year fiscal
−$900BSavings

Restores 75-year solvency · Medium-High confidence

Implementation
Years 1–20+
Y1Y10Y20+
Middle class
Neutral to slightly positive

Benefits preserved for current and near-term retirees. Neutral for middle-income workers under 50.

Planetary
Neutral

No material climate effect.

Description

A balanced package: gradual elimination of the taxable maximum over ten years; modest formula adjustment for the highest pre-retirement earnings quintile, preserving full benefits for the bottom four; raise the full retirement age from 67 to 68 over 30 years for workers now under 50; chained CPI with a minimum-benefit guarantee for low-income beneficiaries. Current-retiree benefits are not cut.

Global precedent

Sweden’s 1990s pension reform and the United Kingdom’s phased state-pension-age increases provide models for durable, notice-rich parametric reform.

Lead mechanism

Social Security Administration; Senate Finance; House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Social Security.

Bipartisan framing

Conservative case

Restores solvency without general-fund subsidies; gradual age adjustment recognizes longevity gains.

Progressive case

High earners contribute on full earnings; formula adjustment is concentrated above the median.

B2 · Pillar B

Standalone page

Medicare site-neutral payment

10-year fiscal
−$750BSavings

$500B–$900B · Medium-High confidence

Implementation
Years 2–6
Y1Y10Y20
Middle class
Positive

Lower Medicare premiums and out-of-pocket costs as program unit costs fall.

Planetary
Neutral

No material climate effect.

Description

Pay the same Medicare rate for the same service whether delivered in a hospital outpatient department or an independent clinic or ambulatory surgical center, with rural-hospital protections and corresponding physician-payment adjustments. Site-neutral savings remain positive under Version 2 but shrink by approximately $30–$40 billion over ten years because universal primary care (D1) modestly increases utilization.

Global precedent

Most OECD systems, including Germany, France, and the Netherlands, do not embed U.S.-scale site-of-service differentials. MedPAC has repeatedly recommended site-neutral payment.

Lead mechanism

CMS; House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Health; Senate Finance Subcommittee on Health Care.

Bipartisan framing

Conservative case

Eliminates a subsidy for hospital consolidation and supports independent physician practices.

Progressive case

Addresses documented overpayment without affecting beneficiary access.

B3 · Pillar B

Standalone page

Prescription drug negotiation expansion

10-year fiscal
−$650BSavings

$500B–$800B · Medium-High confidence

Implementation
Years 1–5
Y1Y10Y20
Middle class
Positive

Substantial reductions in out-of-pocket prescription costs across covered populations.

Planetary
Neutral

No material climate effect.

Description

Expand IRA Medicare drug-price negotiation from the current catalog to a substantially broader set over five years, including biologics, and extend negotiated prices to Medicaid, the VA, and (through reference pricing) commercial markets.

Global precedent

Germany’s AMNOG (2011) produced about 24.5 percent average price reductions on negotiated drugs. The IRA’s first U.S. round achieved 38–79 percent reductions on the initial ten high-cost drugs.

Lead mechanism

CMS; HHS.

Bipartisan framing

Conservative case

Brings market discipline to a price-insensitive segment; rewards true clinical innovation.

Progressive case

Addresses U.S.–international price differentials of 200–400 percent on identical drugs.

B4 · Pillar B

Standalone page

Defense procurement reform

10-year fiscal
−$500BSavings

$300B–$700B · Medium confidence

Implementation
Years 1–7
Y1Y10Y20
Middle class
Neutral

Does not affect uniformed personnel compensation or benefits.

Planetary
Modestly positive

More efficient procurement reduces lifecycle operational waste.

Description

Restructure procurement to address cost-plus contracting, single-source awards, weak competitive bidding, and prime-contractor consolidation. Expand fixed-price contracting where appropriate, mandate competition for services contracts, and enhance GAO oversight. Does not cut troop pay or benefits.

Global precedent

The United Kingdom’s Defence Equipment & Support reform (2014–) and Australian National Audit Office defense-procurement audits.

Lead mechanism

Department of Defense; House and Senate Armed Services; Appropriations.

Bipartisan framing

Conservative case

Taxpayer value and combat capability per dollar.

Progressive case

Addresses long-documented contractor overcharging.

B5 · Pillar B

Standalone page

Agency consolidation and zero-based review

10-year fiscal
−$250BSavings

$100B–$400B · Medium confidence

Implementation
Years 1–10
Y1Y10Y20
Middle class
Neutral on average

Localized federal-employment effects warrant transition support.

Planetary
Neutral

No material climate effect.

Description

Apply zero-based review to federal programs, modeled on Canada’s 1995 Program Review. Consolidate duplicative programs (a recurring GAO finding), modernize administrative infrastructure, and tie evaluation more tightly to budget decisions.

Global precedent

Canada Program Review (1995–2000); New Zealand State Sector Act reforms (1988); UK Spending Reviews.

Lead mechanism

OMB; GAO; House and Senate Budget and Appropriations.

Bipartisan framing

Broadly bipartisan in principle; controversies arise around specific consolidations, not the framework.

B6 · Pillar B

Standalone page

Higher-education subsidy restructuring

10-year fiscal
−$200BSavings

$100B–$300B · Medium confidence

Implementation
Years 1–5
Y1Y10Y20
Middle class
Variable

IDR expansion helps high debt-to-income borrowers; accountability may adjust some institutions.

Planetary
Neutral

No material climate effect.

Description

Restructure federal student-loan and higher-education subsidies to address institutional cost inflation while preserving access: outcome-based accountability, simplified income-driven repayment, modified Public Service Loan Forgiveness, and federal-state community-college coordination.

Global precedent

Australia’s HECS-HELP income-contingent loans (since 1989). England’s post-2012 tuition and loan reforms are an additional, mixed reference point.

Lead mechanism

Department of Education; Senate HELP; House Education and Workforce.

Bipartisan framing

Conservative case

Institutional accountability and outcome-based metrics for federally subsidized education.

Progressive case

Reduced student-debt burden and expanded access.

B7 · Pillar B

Standalone page

Means-testing refinement for high-income beneficiaries

10-year fiscal
−$180BSavings

$100B–$250B · Medium-High confidence

Implementation
Years 2–5
Y1Y10Y20
Middle class
Neutral

Income thresholds preserve middle-class benefit access.

Planetary
Neutral

No material climate effect.

Description

Extend income-related premium adjustments under Medicare Parts B and D further up the income distribution; modest agricultural-subsidy means-testing; tighter means-testing for select benefits where program data support it. Thresholds preserve middle-class access.

Global precedent

Most OECD social-insurance systems use income-related contributions. U.S. Medicare IRMAA already exists and is being recalibrated, not invented.

Lead mechanism

CMS; SSA; USDA; Treasury.

Bipartisan framing

Conservative case

Targets benefits to need; reduces federal cost.

Progressive case

Asks higher-income beneficiaries to contribute more under universal-program architecture.

B8 · Pillar B

Standalone page

Federal real estate and asset management

10-year fiscal
−$100BSavings

$50B–$150B · Medium-High confidence

Implementation
Years 1–10
Y1Y10Y20
Middle class
Neutral

No household tax or benefit change.

Planetary
Modestly positive

Reduced operational emissions from a smaller, better-used portfolio.

Description

Review and rationalize federal real-estate holdings, accelerate disposition of underused property, modernize GSA leasing, and consolidate data-center infrastructure. GAO has long flagged hundreds of billions in underutilized holdings.

Global precedent

UK Government Property Strategy (2018 onward).

Lead mechanism

General Services Administration; OMB.

Bipartisan framing

Broadly bipartisan; standard government-efficiency reform.

B9 · Pillar B

Standalone page

Criminal justice and federal corrections

10-year fiscal
−$80BSavings

$40B–$120B · Medium confidence

Implementation
Years 1–10
Y1Y10Y20
Middle class
Positive in affected communities

Neutral on average federally; larger gains require state adoption.

Planetary
Neutral

No material climate effect.

Description

Reform federal sentencing for nonviolent offenses; expand evidence-based reentry; modernize Bureau of Prisons operations; and extend Version 1 grant conditioning with the D7 state-partnership matching-grant pool for states that adopt equivalent sentencing, diversion, and rehabilitation reforms. Aim: lower fiscal cost and recidivism without sacrificing public safety.

Global precedent

Norway’s reconviction rate is about 20 percent within two years — better than U.S. federal rearrest (~39 percent in three years), though not the 5 percent figure sometimes cited. New York’s ~19 percent reincarceration shows large U.S. gains are feasible. The First Step Act (2018) is the recent bipartisan domestic precedent.

Lead mechanism

Department of Justice; Bureau of Prisons; Senate and House Judiciary.

Bipartisan framing

Conservative case

Fiscal discipline and public-safety effectiveness.

Progressive case

Addresses documented inequities. The First Step Act provides recent bipartisan precedent.

B10 · Pillar B

Standalone page

Improper payment reduction

10-year fiscal
−$300BSavings

$150B–$400B · Medium confidence

Implementation
Years 1–10
Y1Y10Y20
Middle class
Neutral to positive

Reducing fraud preserves program legitimacy without cutting eligible benefits.

Planetary
Neutral

No material climate effect.

Description

Federal-wide effort to cut overpayments and payments to ineligible recipients across Medicare, Medicaid, EITC, unemployment insurance, and procurement, through payment-integrity systems, data-matching, and modernized verification. GAO documents $200–$250 billion in annual improper payments.

Global precedent

OECD public-integrity standards; UK Government Counter Fraud Function (2019).

Lead mechanism

OMB; CMS, USDA, Treasury, Labor.

Bipartisan framing

Broadly bipartisan. Standard government-integrity reform.

Figures in this framework are illustrative directional estimates derived from publicly available data and conventional Congressional Budget Office budget-window logic. They are not official CBO scores. Any provision adopted from this framework would require formal CBO scoring before legislative consideration. This document is a policy white paper, not an introduced bill.