F2 · Foundation · Institutional Integrity
Medium-term fiscal rules
Statutory debt-to-GDP and structural-deficit targets, with automatic-stabilizer suspensions in defined emergencies and five-year sunset reviews. Binding as statute subject to congressional override — not a constitutional amendment.
- 10-year fiscal
- −$200B (indirect)Savings
- Implementation
- Year 1 onward
- Middle class
- Neutral
- Planetary
- Neutral
Depends on political response · Low-Medium confidence
No direct household instrument.
No direct climate instrument.
Global precedent
Germany’s Schuldenbremse (2009); Switzerland’s Debt Brake (2003); EU Stability and Growth Pact. Each has been suspended at points — hence explicit emergency clauses here.
Lead mechanism
Congressional action.
Bipartisan framing
Design is contested (targets, stabilizers, investment carve-outs). Statutory architecture with emergency clauses is meant to broaden the feasible coalition.
Figures in this framework are illustrative directional estimates derived from publicly available data and conventional Congressional Budget Office budget-window logic. They are not official CBO scores. Any provision adopted from this framework would require formal CBO scoring before legislative consideration. This document is a policy white paper, not an introduced bill.